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'The Local Mindset"
transcribedremarks of
THE HONORABLE D. LOWELL JENSEN*

I started out as a California prosecutor. From the perspective of
the California prosecutor back in the 1970s, we were of course
intensely concerned with, interested in, and cognizant of the profound
consequences of Watergate. But mostly as American citizens, not so
much in our capacities as public prosecutors. There is an institutional
difference between how the prosecution function is delivered in the
state system, and how it is delivered in the federal system. That
means that although Watergate did not have direct relevance to us, it
did have an effect on prosecutors in terms of raising our
consciousness in terms of ethical behavior, and it still does.
The mindset of the local prosecutor, at that time and now, is that
there is no case that cannot be handled and investigated all the way
through by the local prosecutor. That includes all levels of
corruption. Frankly, the local prosecutors believe that if there were
corruption within the local jurisdiction, there is no reason for the
federal government to come in, because they can take care of it. I
think that this is a basic local mindset. Having had my own
experience in the Criminal Division watching the activities of people
like Reid Weingarten in the public integrity section, it's a sort of a
parochial mindset, but it is still there. There has been a history in
California of prosecutions at the state, local and county levels, and
those prosecutions have been carried out within the system. They
have not led to the development of any kind of independent body of
prosecutors or investigators. They all have been handled within the
system.
The local prosecutor is part of the government of the state, is an
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executive official, and carries out a public prosecution function, the
same as the Attorney General does at the national level. But the
systems really are different. State governments actually have more
than one unit of government. There are three separate levels: the
state, the county, and the municipal and city level. The state has all
the functions of the government; it has a governor and an attorney
general, a legislature, and a judicial branch. These bodies, in the state
system, do not directly relate to the local prosecutor. Neither the
governor, nor any other executive in the state system can remove a
local prosecutor. They simply don't have that power. There is in the
California Constitution a provision which states that the attorney
general is a "supervisor" of local district attorneys, but it does not
really play out that way or have any effect upon removal power. At
the county level, the district attorney is elected by the county
electorate, and that is the same as all of the other officials. The board
of supervisors, the legislative body in the county, is elected but
doesn't have any power over the local district attorney. They do not
have the power of removal. The only people who can do that are the
electorate, so the district attorney in the local setting has a different
kind of relationship to the power that is given to him by the public
than one has in the federal system. As far as the system itself is
concerned, the board of supervisors sets your budget, so to that extent
the power of the purse can have an effect in this area.
But in California, Watergate really did not have much of an
impact upon the function itself. Back in the 1970s there was a
prosecutor in a local county who was deemed by a majority of the
board of supervisors to be a little too aggressive in terms of local
corruption, so they removed half of his investigators and gave them to
the sheriff. The California courts looked at that and said: "No, you
can't do that." They stated that the investigative function of a
prosecutor is completely inseparable from the public prosecution
function, that the board of supervisors doesn't have the power to take
that function away and that it can't be assigned to another agency. So
they had to be returned to the prosecutor.
There is also a different relationship in terms of the way in which
the public prosecutor in California is defined. As I said, the state
attorney general has a supervisorial role. In practice, this means that
it is a complementary role. It means that if for some reason, the
district attorney is no longer able to function in the county, the state
attorney general can come in and take over. It also provides a way in
which the problems of recusal, where a district attorney may be faced
with prosecuting a member of the office, is met by the state attorney
general coming in and handling the case. In the state attorney
general's office, you have an institutionally independent prosecutor
who is available to come in should there be a reason for the local
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prosecutor to be displaced.
There are other aspects that should be borne in mind. The
culture and the business of the local prosecutor is probably different
than at the federal level. The local prosecutor would be more
comfortable prosecuting the burglars in the Watergate affair than the
people who were involved in the cover-up. And that is what local
prosecutors do-they are overwhelmed with trying murders, rapes,
burglaries, and robberies. They have an overwhelming workload with
marginal resources, so the idea of committing investigators or
prosecutions to a public integrity section is a nice idea but is virtually
unavailable to the local prosecutor. They simply don't have the time
or resources to do that. That is a weakness in the system and it ought
to be something that is dealt with. But, if you look at the local
prosecutor, you see that the problems for the local prosecutor are that
the jurisdiction ends at the county line. That is the biggest problemyou don't have the resources. You lack the resources to commit to
complex long-term investigations, and the resources to develop the
skills to be able to do this. The federal government can provide that,
but local prosecution is simply overwhelmed by its burden of just
delivering the services.
One other aspect that should be noted about the local prosecutor
in California (this is not true in every state) is that the elected position
is non-partisan. The elected position is non-partisan not only in
rhetoric, but in reality. At least it was back in those days (the
Watergate period). Maybe it is a level of innocence, but it really was
deemed to be an apolitical position. The position itself, the decisions
made by the local prosecutor were apolitical, and if there was a tinge
of partisanship, there was a reaction by people who would say "this is
an abuse of the prosecutorial system." So you did have an apolitical
kind of function in existence.
The perceived institutional conflict of the executive investigating
itself is not a part of the prosecution service in California and most
states. It just does not happen that way. But when you look at it not
only in terms of the mechanics of prosecution, but in terms of the
ethics of prosecution, I think that Watergate played a role. In
California in 1974 and 1975, the district attorney's association
developed and promulgated, I think for the first time in this country,
uniform crime charging standards which were essentially ethical
behavior norms that were put together by the prosecutors. I do not
think that Watergate specifically stimulated that, but it did allow us to
get a lot of money out of Washington to do it, and I think that it
performed a significant role in raising the consciousness and the
urgency of improving the ethical behavior of prosecutors. So I think
that there was an effect as far as that's concerned.
Just a few words about the experiences on the Justice
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Department end. I remember the George Hansen case. I have a little
bit of a different take on it. I was appointed the associate attorney
general. During the confirmation process, it turned out that they
weren't going to confirm me, because I was the one in charge of the
George Hansen prosecution. It took a little while to get that undone.
But that was undone. I must say that the experience of coming to
Washington in the Criminal Division and being able to interact with
public integrity section lawyers that I thought were as good as the
prosecutors in my office back in California was a wonderful thing to
see. These were extremely dedicated and talented people who
commit themselves to do this. I think that the federal government is
performing a tremendous service in being able to give resources to
the whole country, to do complex investigations, to reach into any
level of corruption.
One of the other tasks that I had when I was in the Justice
Department was working with the U.S. Marshal Service and part of
my responsibility was to make decisions in terms of whether security
details of the marshal's service should be given to federal judges.
Now at that time I thought that federal judges were fungible. I think I
have changed my mind on that. I think that maybe the notion of
going after federal judges by prosecution; maybe we could ease up on
that a little bit.
My final comment is that given the structure, i.e., the way in
which the prosecution services are delivered at the local level, the
volcano of change that Reid Weingarten spoke about that was
created by the firing of Archibald Cox' just did not resonate in this
criminal system. The mountain was not there.
Thank you very much.
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